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Priority No. 15 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MICHAEL KOURIS, individually, and for the 
ESTATE OF MICHAEL KOURIS, a deceased minor; and 
PAM KOURIS, individually, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL, STATE OF UTAH and 
CORTLAND CHILDS, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action in December, 
1998 (R. 1-5), alleging that defendants had wrongfully caused the 
death of their son in a collision between his bicycle and 
defendant state trooper Childs1 patrol vehicle. Subsequent to 
defendants' answer (R. 15-21), plaintiffs added claims for 
negligent supervision and civil rights violations (amended 
complaint, R. 62-69) . On August 7, 2000, defendants moved the 
court separately to dismiss the civil rights claims (R. 115-37), 
to dismiss the claims against defendant Childs (R. 138-55), and 
to grant summary judgment on all claims (R. 156-214) . They 
further moved on September 18, 2000, to strike the affidavit of 
plaintiffs1 sole designated expert witness filed in response to 
these motions (R. 289-355). After an exchange of memoranda and 
hearings on three dates--during one of which plaintiffs 
stipulated to dismiss their civil rights claims and the 
individual claims against Trooper Childs (R. 651 at 9)--the 
district court granted summary judgment for defendants on January 
3, 2001, and also declined plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 56(f) (R. 605-14). On 
January 29, 2001, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal 
(R. 645-46) . This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 2001) as a case 
not within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court correctly find that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment for 
defendants? 
Plaintiffs cite to R. 360 and 363 as the portions of the 
record preserving their claim that the trial court erroneously 
made findings of material fact (see Aplt. Brief at 1). However, 
these record citations do not identify any material facts found 
by the court that are subject to dispute. The court ruled in 
defendants' favor on the undisputed facts (see R. 611-12). 
Standard of Review: "On appeal from a summary judgment, 
this Court resolves only legal issues, and we do not, therefore, 
defer to the trial court's rulings. We determine only whether 
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether 
the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues 
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of material fact." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989); see also Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 1|l2, 28 P.3d 1271. 
2. Did the district court correctly hold that Trooper 
Childs1 actions were immunized from liability under the exception 
to waiver of immunity for the operation of an emergency vehicle 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 2001) and 
41-6-14 (1998) ? 
Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their memorandum opposing 
summary judgment (see R. 364-68). The court ruled in defendants1 
favor on the issue (see R. 612). 
Standard of Review: the Court reviews questions of law for 
correctness. See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151; Hill, 2001 UT 16, 1l2. 
3. Did the district court err in striking the affidavit of 
plaintiffs1 sole designated expert witness as irrelevant to the 
issues for decision and because he was unqualified to opine on 
Trooper Childs1 alleged impairment by prescription medications? 
Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their memorandum opposing 
defendants1 motion to strike the expert's affidavit (see 
R. 502-513). The court ruled for defendants on this issue (see 
R. 612). 
Standard of Review: "[Q]uestions regarding the relevance of 
evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion." Slisze v. 
Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 1l9, 979 P.2d 317. Moreover, 
" [t]he determination of whether a witness is qualified as an 
expert is within the trial court's discretion." Vitale v. 
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Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah App. 1996); see also 
Patev v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, 1|l5, 977 P.2d 1193. 
4. Did the court abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiffs1 motion to reconsider, under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 
56(f), its grant of summary judgment for defendants to allow 
evidence from a former treating physician whose identity 
defendants had previously disclosed to them but whom plaintiffs 
did not name as a witness? 
Plaintiffs raised the issue of submitting this additional 
evidence by motion and memorandum to the court (R. 539-78). The 
court ruled for defendants on this issue (see R. 607). 
Standard of Review: "We review the trial court's denial of 
a motion to reconsider summary judgment under rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion." Lund v. 
Hall. 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997). Likewise, this Court "will 
review a trial court's grant or denial of a rule 56(f) motion 
under an abuse of discretion standard." Price Dev. Co. v. Orem 
City, 2000 UT 26, ^30, 995 P.2d 1237. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained 
in the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint and jury demand on December 
21, 1998 (R. 1-5). The complaint asserted that Trooper Childs' 
negligent operation of a patrol vehicle caused it to collide with 
the bicycle on which plaintiffs' 11-year-old son, Michael, was 
riding, injuring the boy and ultimately causing his death (R. 2). 
It further alleged that at all relevant times, Trooper Childs was 
acting within the course and scope of his employment and that 
defendants Utah Highway Patrol and the State of Utah are 
therefore vicariously liable (R. 2). Plaintiffs sought special 
and general damages for Michael's medical expenses, suffering, 
funeral expenses, and wrongful death (R. 5) . Defendants answered 
(R. 15-21), denying liability and raising a number of defenses, 
including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted and protection from liability under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint (R. 62-69) 
to add claims of negligent supervision, based on Trooper Child's 
alleged prescription drug dependencies, and violations of their 
civil rights. On August 7, 2000, defendants filed three motions: 
one seeking dismissal of the civil rights claims (R. 115-37); 
another seeking dismissal of the claims against Trooper Childs 
(R. 138-55); and a third seeking summary judgment on all claims 
based on governmental immunity (R. 156-214). At a hearing on 
September 18, 2000, plaintiffs agreed not to contest the first 
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two motions, withdrawing their civil rights claims and all 
individual claims against Trooper Childs (R. 651 at 9-10). 
Also on September 18, 2000, defendants moved to strike the 
affidavit of plaintiffs' sole designated expert witness, Richard 
Streumpler (R. 289-355), which was attached as an exhibit to 
plaintiffs' oppositional memoranda, and to exclude'him from 
testifying at trial. The basis for the motion was that, as a 
clinical chemist with no medical training, he is incompetent to 
opine as to Trooper Childs1 alleged impairment by prescribed 
medications at the time of the accident. At plaintiffs1 request, 
the summary judgment hearing was continued to October 2, 2000 
(R. 652) to address the motion to strike following an exchange of 
memoranda, and the district court judge granted both motions from 
the bench on that date (R. 652 at 16 and 52). 
On October 17, 2000, plaintiffs moved the court to 
reconsider its summary judgment ruling pursuant to Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b) and 56(f) (R. 539-78), arguing that another witness, 
from among plaintiffs' generically designated "medical providers 
who have treated defendant Cortland Childs in the past" (R. 108), 
could render an expert opinion as to Trooper Childs' alleged 
impairment. Defendants opposed this asserted "new evidence," 
arguing, inter alia, that the witness in question had been 
disclosed to plaintiffs well in advance of argument on the 
summary judgment motion but plaintiffs had never designated him 
by name as a witness or for purposes other than to authenticate 
medical records and reports (R. 579-88) . After a third hearing 
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date on November 27, 2000 (R. 653), the court agreed with 
defendants that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 56(f) and denied the motion to reconsider in 
a memorandum decision filed January 3, 2001 (R. 605-14). 
Plaintiffs1 notice of appeal followed on January 29, 2001 
(R. 645-46). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On July 19, 1998, a collision occurred in Price, Utah, 
between a Utah Highway Patrol vehicle driven by Trooper Childs 
and a bicycle operated by Michael Kouris, the eleven-year-old son 
of plaintiffs, which resulted in Michael's death (R. 2). 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that at the time of the accident, Trooper 
Childs was acting within the course and scope of his employment 
with the Utah Highway Patrol (R. 2) . 
Just before the accident occurred, Trooper Childs received a 
radio transmission describing a child riding in the trunk of an 
automobile and holding down the trunk lid (R. 161 and 187). When 
he realized that he was the closest officer to the reported 
vehicle, Trooper Childs responded by increasing his speed in an 
attempt to catch up to the reported vehicle (R. 162 and 188). At 
that time, a red car was in front of him, northbound on Carbon 
Avenue, a two-way street with one lane of traffic in either 
direction and a center turning lane (R. 162 and 190). As the red 
car approached the intersection of Carbon Avenue and 500 South, 
it slowed to accommodate a decreased speed limit (R. 162-63 and 
3 93). At the same time, Trooper Childs began to pull into the 
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center lane to pass the red car and activated his emergency 
lights (R. 163 and 190)--just as Michael Kouris steered his 
bicycle onto the roadway from the east shoulder where he had been 
riding (R. 163 and 403), more than 36 feet short of the crosswalk 
(R. 195). Although Trooper Childs swerved in an attempt to avert 
a collision (R. 190), he was unable to avoid the impact which 
resulted in Michael1s injuries. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for the 
negligent acts of its employees, with certain exceptions. One of 
those exceptions is for injury that "arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from . . . (15) the operation of an emergency 
vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements 
of Section 41-6-14." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001). 
The undisputed facts show that Trooper Childs was in compliance 
with the statute at the time of the accident. Consequently, the 
district court correctly applied the law and determined that 
defendants bore no liability for the actions that resulted in 
Michael's unfortunate death. To the extent that plaintiffs 
contend there are genuine factual disputes, they have either 
neglected to raise the issues in the district court, thereby 
waiving them for purposes of appeal, or failed to demonstrate 
that the facts they now contest are material to this Court's 
decision. 
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Plaintiffs attempt to escape summary judgment by claiming 
that Trooper Childs was impaired at the time of the accident by 
the use of prescription medications. However, the sole evidence 
presented in the district court to support this theory was the 
affidavit of a clinical chemist with no medical training. As the 
court correctly ruled, any nexus between Trooper Childs1 
prescription medications and his alleged impairment was beyond 
the competence of this witness. Excluding his affidavit from 
consideration was therefore within the court's discretion. 
Finally, plaintiffs claim that the court erred in denying 
their motion to admit additional evidence under Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b) and 56(f) after summary judgment for defendants had been 
announced from the bench. The proposed evidence, in the form of 
an affidavit from a one-time treating physician whose identity 
was known to plaintiffs well in advance of the summary judgment 
argument but who was not named as a witness, did not meet the 
requirements of the rules and was irrelevant to the issue of 
Trooper Childs1 alleged impairment at the time of the accident, 
the purpose for which it was presented. The court was therefore 
within its discretion to deny the motion. 
In short, plaintiffs have shown neither abuse of discretion 
nor error of law in the district court's decision. Consequently, 
that decision is entitled to this Court's affirmance. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT TROOPER CHILDSf 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTE GOVERNING EMERGENCY VEHICLE 
OPERATION ENTITLES HIM TO IMMUNITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 63-30-10(15). 
A. Recharacterizing the Claim as One for Negligent Supervision 
Does Not Change the Relevant Facts or Alter the Analysis. 
Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code waives governmental 
immunity for injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions 
of government employees. However, the statute also contains a 
number of explicit exceptions from that waiver "if the injury 
arises out of, in connection with, or results from? specified 
causes. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001) . Included among 
the listed causes is "the operation of an emergency vehicle, 
while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6-14." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 2001). 
The circumstance giving rise to plaintiffs' claim in the 
present action is Trooper Childs' allegedly negligent operation 
of his patrol vehicle, while responding to a call he perceived as 
an emergency, in a manner that caused the death of plaintiffs1 
son. However, plaintiffs have withdrawn all individual claims 
against Trooper Childs (see R. 651 at 9). Even though their 
cause of action "arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from" the operation of an emergency vehicle by Trooper Childs 
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001)), plaintiffs attempt to 
recharacterize their claim as one against defendant Utah Highway 
Patrol (UHP) for negligent supervision. 
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This Court has repeatedly "rejected attempts to evade the 
statutory categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of 
the injury." Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996); see 
also Bullock v. State, Dep't of Transp., 966 P.2d 1215, 1217 
(Utah App. 1998). As the Court has stated, "If a subpart of 
section 63-30-10 describes that conduct or situati6n [giving rise 
to the alleged injury], then immunity is preserved." Malcolm v. 
State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1994); see also Ledfors v. 
Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993). For 
this reason, the district court correctly analyzed plaintiffs' 
action under the exception to waiver of immunity pursuant to the 
emergency vehicle exception. 
B. There is No Need to Reach the Issue of Duty When Defendants 
Have Not Challenged It and Governmental Immunity Provides a 
Complete Defense. 
In order for the emergency vehicle exception to apply, the 
statute requires that the vehicle be driven in compliance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1998). In relevant part, the statute 
states: 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when 
in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law or when responding to but not upon returning 
from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges under 
this section, subject to Subsections (2) through (4). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign, but only after slowing down as may be 
necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction 
of movement or turning in specified directions. 
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(3) Privileges granted under this section to the 
operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not 
involved in a vehicle pursuit, apply only when the 
operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under 
Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined 
under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in front 
of the vehicle. 
Plaintiffs attempt to argue around the statute by contending 
that before the question of immunity is reached, the court "must 
first decide whether the defendants owed a duty of due care to 
the plaintiff" (Aplt. Brief at 33). They further argue that 
under this analytical approach, "the inquiry is not whether 
§41-6-14 (1993) imposes a duty; rather, the question is whether 
there are any statutory or common-law duties intended to protect 
the plaintiffs from the type of harm they suffered" (Aplt. Brief 
at 33-34) . This argument both misconstrues the holdings of the 
cases they cite in its support and squarely contradicts well-
established authority to the contrary. As the Court explained in 
Ledfors, questions of governmental immunity are independent of 
the tort questions of duty and breach: 
In some of our past cases in which we analyzed 
such a claim against a governmental entity, we have 
begun with a traditional tort analysis to determine 
whether the plaintiff had alleged a legally cognizable 
duty and breach of duty. If the plaintiff had not 
stated a legally valid tort cause of action, we usually 
have declined to undertake the immunity analysis. At 
other times, we have performed the immunity analysis 
first, typically when it ended the inquiry. 
Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1163-64 (citations omitted). In other 
words, the purpose of undertaking a duty analysis first is to 
ensure that no duty is presumed where none exists: 
Whatever the order in which we address the 
questions, it is important to keep in mind that a 
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legislative waiver of immunity is not a legislative 
consent to liability. Even when immunity is waived, 
there can be no liability absent a breach of a common 
law duty owed to the plaintiff. 
Id. Where duty is not contested--as in Ledfors, and as here, for 
purposes of summary judgment--and where the statutory exception 
to waiver of immunity resolves the claim, there is no reason to 
reach the element of duty. Instead, the court will assume, 
without deciding, the existence of a legal duty. See Malcolm, 
878 P.2d at 1146. 
The cases on which plaintiffs rely, Day v. State, 1999 UT 
46, 980 P.2d 1171, and Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, 
vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 2000 UT 55, 5 P.3d 
616, are not to the contrary (see Aplt. Brief at 32-36). In Day, 
the State defendants explicitly raised the issue of whether they 
owed a duty of care to plaintiff: "The State denies that it or 
Officer Colyar owed a duty of care to the Days." Day, 1999 UT 46 
at 111. In that circumstance, as the Court observed, "If Officer 
Colyar owed no duty of care to the Days, there can be no prima 
facie case of negligence as a matter of law, and immunity would 
be immaterial." Id. at 1l0. The opposite is true here: if 
immunity applies, as the district court held that it does, the 
issue of duty is immaterial. Because defendants in the case at 
bar have never challenged the element of duty, Day is factually 
inapposite to plaintiffs1 claims. 
Nor does Lyon support plaintiffs' position. The Lyon 
defendants, like defendants here, contended that provisions of 
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the Governmental Immunity Act provided them complete immunity. 
The Court "address [ed] this claim first because plaintiffs other 
claims are relevant only if the Act does not provide complete 
immunity." Lyon, 2000 UT 19, 1|l0. Plaintiffs have provided no 
reason compelling the Court, contrary to its own decision in 
Lyon, to address an issue there is no need to reach. 
Plaintiffs' statutory construction argument on the issue of 
duty (see Aplt. Brief at 35-38) fails for two reasons. First, as 
explained above, it addresses an issue which would have been 
relevant only had the trial court found that immunity did not 
provide a complete defense. Second, the argument was not raised 
in the trial court and is therefore inappropriate for this 
Court's deliberations. It is the well-established practice of 
Utah's appellate courts not to reach issues not presented to the 
trial court. "An appellate court generally will not review any 
issue that was not raised in the court below. This rule is 
based, in part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the 
trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue that it was 
never given the opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 
UT 101, 1|30, 16 P.3d 1233 (citation omitted); see also Julian v. 
State, 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998) (noting the court's 
"longstanding rule that we will not consider issues raised for 
the first time on appeal"). Because plaintiffs did not give the 
trial court an opportunity to rule on their statutory 
construction argument, it is improperly presented here. 
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C. The Undisputed Facts Entitle Defendants to Immunity under 
the Emergency Vehicle Exception. 
The Test and the Undisputed Facts 
The test for governmental immunity is 
a three-step analysis: (1) Did the [defendants] here 
perform a governmental function? (2) If so, does some 
section of the governmental immunity act waive the 
general immunity granted by section 63-30-3? ' (3) Does 
the governmental immunity act nonetheless except from 
that waiver of blanket immunity the particular claim 
asserted here? 
Petersen v. Board of Educ, 855 P.2d 241, 243 (Utah 1993). 
Plaintiffs have conceded the performance of a governmental 
function under section 63-30-3, the waiver of immunity under 
section 63-3-10, and the existence of an apparent exception under 
section 63-30-10(15) (see Aplt. Brief at 39). As they admit, 
"[t]he question is whether the exception applies" (id.). The 
court's careful application of the law to the relevant, 
undisputed facts shows that it does. 
The court predicated its decision on the following eight 
undisputed facts: 
1. At the time of the collision Trooper Childs was 
responding to an emergency radio call. 
2. At the time of the collision Trooper Childs was 
driving in an authorized emergency vehicle as defined 
by UCA 41-6-1(3) . 
3. At the time of the collision Trooper Childs had 
activated the vehicle[']s visible signal as defined by 
UCA 41-6-132. 
4. The collision took place on Carbon Avenue south of 
the intersection of Carbon Avenue and 5th South (the 
intersection). Immediately north of the intersection 
is a cross walk. 
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5. Michael Kouris was not crossing Carbon Avenue at 
the cross walk. The point of collision being some 3 0+ 
feet south of the cross walk. 
6. There are no semaphores or stop signs at the 
intersection controlling traffic in the direction both 
Trooper Childs and Michael Kouris were traveling. 
7. The state and UHP are governmental entities. 
8. At the time of the collision Cortland Childs was 
acting within the scope of his employment with the Utah 
Highway Patrol. 
R. 611-12. Plaintiffs attack the findings numbered 1, 3, 4, and 
5 (see Aplt. Brief at 28-32) as genuinely disputed for purposes 
of summary judgment. The record, however, belies their 
contentions. 
The Call was One to Which an Emergency Response was Appropriate 
Plaintiffs first claim that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Trooper Childs was responding to an 
emergency (see Aplt. Brief at 28-31). In support of this claim, 
they attach, as an exhibit to their brief, an excerpt from the 
affidavit of Officer Tracy Allred of the Price Police Department 
(Aplt. Brief at Ex. B). The exhibit, however, does not support 
plaintiffs' contention that Officer Allred did not believe the 
call was an emergency. It merely recounts what the officer heard 
when the initial call about the child riding in an automobile 
trunk was made to dispatch. Contrary to plaintiffs1 
representation, the excerpt contains no statement by Officer 
Allred describing the dispatch as "a response call" rather than 
an emergency (see Aplt. Brief at 29), nor does it support 
plaintiffs' representation that Officer Allred "did not turn on 
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his emergency lights or sirens. He did not speed to the scene, 
nor break any other traffic laws as he responded to the scene" 
(id.). In fact, there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Officer Allred responded to the call at all (though he did 
respond to the subsequent accident), particularly in light of the 
fact that Trooper Childs communicated that he was the closest 
vehicle and would respond (see R. 190). 
Tellingly, plaintiffs have not given a record citation for 
the Allred deposition excerpt, there is no other indication that 
it was ever presented as evidence to the trial court, and 
defendants' scrutiny of the record has found no trace of it. As 
this Court has stated, "[W]e do not consider new evidence on 
appeal." Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990); see also 
Otteson v. State, Dep't of Human Services, 945 P.2d 170, 171 
(Utah App. 1997) ("Appellate courts will not consider new 
evidence on appeal"). Therefore, even if the Allred excerpt were 
relevant to plaintiffs' argument, it is properly disregarded by 
the Court as not of record in the trial court. 
The evidence of record uniformly supports the district 
court's finding. Trooper Childs stated in his deposition that he 
considered the situation an emergency (R. 187). Newell Knight, 
an accident reconstructionist (see R. 113), replied affirmatively 
in his deposition when asked if he agreed that the situation was 
an emergency (R. 287). Don Kelley, Trooper Childs' sergeant at 
the time of the accident, also agreed in his deposition testimony 
that the situation was an emergency (R. 212-13) . Even 
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plaintiffs1 reconstruction expert, Ronald Probert (see R. 107), 
acknowledged that it was within Trooper Childs' discretion to 
respond to the situation as an emergency (R. 284). Not a shred 
of record evidence supports plaintiffs' contention that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists regarding the propriety of Trooper 
Childs' election to respond to the call as an emergency. 
Trooper Childs Activated a Visual Signal as Required by Statute 
Plaintiffs concede that Trooper Childs "turn[ed] on his 
lights as he passed Tammy Auberger" before the collision (Aplt. 
Brief at 31). This concession is fully consistent with the 
deposition testimony of the witnesses. As Trooper Childs 
explained, he activated his lights, increased his speed, and 
changed lanes to pass Ms. Auberger's car all at the same time 
(R. 190-91) . This testimony is corroborated by the statements of 
two other witnesses, Jan Nelson (see R. 413-14) and John 
Wunnenberg (see R. 204) . Even plaintiffs do not contend that Ms. 
Auberger's failure to observe the lights raises a genuine issue 
of material fact. 
In addition to conceding the fact that Trooper Childs' 
emergency lights were activated prior to the collision, 
plaintiffs do not argue that this visible signal failed to comply 
with the statute. Instead, they maintain that the activation of 
the lights was an insufficient precaution. Their irrelevant, 
two-sentence argument on this point (see Aplt. Brief at 31) is 
both inflammatory and unsupported by record evidence. Contending 
that Trooper Childs "was speeding through an intersection with 
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children in the crosswalk" (Aplt. Brief at 31) (emphasis in 
original), they ignore the uncontested facts that Michael entered 
the intersection more than 36 feet before the crosswalk (R. 195) 
and that the point of impact was south of the intersection (see 
R. 196 and 201). It is likewise uncontested that the crosswalk 
in question was north of the intersection (see R. 196 and 201). 
Consequently, Trooper ChiIds could not have been speeding through 
the intersection with children present; he did not speed through 
the intersection at all. Moreover, as defendants pointed out 
below, the witness testimony on which plaintiffs relied "was that 
children were near the crosswalk, not in the crosswalk" (R. 273; 
see also R. 3 96), and "the video of the accident shows that no 
one was in the crosswalk at the time of the accident" (R. 273). 
Plaintiffs' unsupported statement to the contrary serves no 
purpose other than an attempt to provoke the Court's outrage. It 
certainly does nothing to establish whether a visual signal was 
properly activated. 
The Location of the Intersection and Crosswalk are Not Contested 
Plaintiffs list as contested the district court's statement 
regarding the location of the collision and the crosswalk (see 
Aplt. Brief at 31). Beyond repeating the court's statement, they 
provide no analysis of the court's language or citation to the 
record. This void does not fulfill plaintiffs' burden under Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9), which requires that "[t]he argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
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to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." This 
Court has repeatedly held that it "'is not simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.»" Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.\ 2001 UT 77, 
U20 n.4, 31 P.3d 557 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 
416 N.E. 2d 783, 784, 48 111. Dec. 510 (111. App. 1981))); see 
also State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, \ l \ n.3, 27 P.3d 1133. 
Given the absence of any discussion by plaintiffs, there is no 
need to give further consideration to this unsupported challenge. 
Plaintiffs did Not Argue Below that Michael was in the Crosswalk 
Plaintiffs now purport to contest the previously undisputed 
fact that Michael was not in the crosswalk at the time of the 
collision (see Aplt. Brief at 32). Not only is this fact 
immaterial to the issues for decision, but it has been raised for 
the first time on appeal. As previously noted, it is the Court's 
well-established practice not to review issues appellants failed 
to raise in the district court. See Ellis, 2000 UT 101, 1f3 0; 
Julian, 966 P.2d at 258. Plaintiffs have articulated no grounds 
on which this well-established rule should be ignored. 
Even if the Court were to consider plaintiffs' belated 
challenge, plaintiffs have not shown how the fact is material to 
whether defendants complied with the emergency vehicle operation 
statute, which bears no language addressing crosswalks. As this 
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Court has recognized, "the mere existence of genuine issues of 
fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the entry of 
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of 
the case." Horcran v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 
(Utah 1982). Plaintiffs have made no attempt to show any nexus 
between Michael's position in or out of the crosswalk and the 
issues before the Court for determination. 
The Court Correctly Applied the Law to the Undisputed Facts 
Given the undisputed facts as the trial court found them, 
plaintiffs have shown--and can show--no error in its application 
of the law to the facts. Trooper Childs was operating an 
authorized emergency vehicle and responding to an emergency call. 
Therefore, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14, he was statutorily 
privileged to exceed the maximum speed limit and to disregard 
regulations governing direction of movement and turning. Those 
privileges are restricted to emergency vehicles using a visual 
signal as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-132 which is 
visible from the front of the vehicle or, alternatively, an 
audible signal. (Plaintiffs have raised no issue regarding the 
compliance of the emergency lights in the patrol vehicle with 
section 41-6-132.) Trooper Childs activated the visual signal 
prior to the collision in compliance with the plain language of 
the statute. For these reasons, the court correctly concluded 
that " [a]t the time of the collision Trooper Childs was operating 
his emergency vehicle in accordance with the requirements of UCA 
41-6-14" (R. 612) and that defendants are consequently immune 
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from liability under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15), a 
determination entitled to affirmance by this Court. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT WITNESS. 
A. Admissibility of Expert Testimony is a Matter within the 
Trial Court's Discretion 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the testimony 
of expert witnesses. Under the rule, "[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an expert opinion or otherwise." Under this Court's 
jurisprudence, fl[t]he trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such 
decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Under this standard, we will not reverse unless the decision 
exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
B. The Motion to Strike the Expert's Affidavit was Timely 
In attempting to circumvent Trooper Childs' immunity under 
the law, plaintiffs claim that he was impaired by prescription 
medications at the time of the accident. In support of this 
claim, plaintiffs designated Richard Streumpler, a clinical 
chemist with no medical training, as their sole expert witness on 
the issue of Trooper Childs' purported impairment. This 
designation was mailed to defendants on April 10, 2000, and filed 
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with the trial court on April 13 (see R. 106 and 108). However, 
not until August 28, 2000, did plaintiffs provide Streumpler's 
curriculum vitae to defendants (see R. 520), who took his 
deposition just four days later, on September 1 (id.). 
Although defendants' motion for summary judgment had been 
mailed to plaintiffs on August 4, 2000, and filed with the court 
on August 7 (see R. 156 and 158), plaintiffs sought and received 
an extension of nearly three weeks, until September 6, 2000, to 
serve defendants with a copy of their response, which included 
the Streumpler affidavit. The response was filed with the court 
on September 18, 2000 (see R. 360). Defendants mailed their 
motion to strike the affidavit to plaintiffs on September 13, 
2000 (R. 302), only five days after the affidavit was originally 
mailed to them; the motion was filed with the court on September 
18 (R. 289). 
It is clear from this timetable that defendants not only 
responded promptly to the information provided in the affidavit, 
but that they agreed to an extension of nearly three weeks for 
plaintiffs to file the affidavit in response to defendants1 
motion for summary judgment. Any argument plaintiffs make as to 
a lack of timeliness in moving to strike the tardy affidavit is 
unsupported by the facts. Moreover, as defendants pointed out 
below, plaintiffs provide no authority establishing a time 
requirement for the filing of a motion to strike (see R. 520). 
Further, as Utah's appellate courts have recognized, 
"It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and 
superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers 
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not derived from any statute. Among these are the 
power to . . . make, modify, and enforce rules for the 
regulation of the business before the court . . . . 
Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the 
proper discharge of their duties . . . ." 
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, 1l3, 985 P.2d 255 (quoting In 
re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, 224 (1913) (cited in Barnard 
v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993))). See also Charlie 
Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 
(Utah App. 1987) (noting "'the control necessarily vested in 
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly 
and expeditious disposition of cases'") (quoting Link v. Wabash 
R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962))). Especially in light of 
plaintiffs' own request for additional time to file a response to 
the motion for summary judgment, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing defendants' motion to strike. 
The district court, observing that defendants became aware 
of the competence issue only on plaintiffs' use of the Streumpler 
affidavit in response to the summary judgment motion, stated that 
the motion to strike 
was timely and in support of [defendants'] Motion for 
Summary Judgement [sic] which was also timely filed 
under the original scheduling order, before August 10, 
2000, to wit: on August 7, 2000. Discovery under the 
original scheduling order was to have been complete by 
May 19, 2000. The parties mutually agreed to an 
extension of that date and the Court concurred in their 
actions. The original oral arguments on dispositive 
motions were to be scheduled before September 1, 2000. 
Again, however, at the request of the parties the Court 
concurred in a modification of that original order and 
scheduled oral argument for September 18, 2000. At the 
same time the Court allowed the parties time to file 
formal responses to various pending motions, as well as 
pleadings to clear up the record to the extent 
necessary. Again, the order provided for specific 
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dates for those filings and it appears from the record 
that the parties, although not technically complying 
with those dates, may have shared their responses in a 
relatively timely fashion and neither party raised 
those issues in their pleadings and/or at oral 
argument. 
R. 609-10. Plaintiffs neither cite to nor address the court's 
explanation for its decision that the motion to strike was 
timely. However, it is clear that the court's decision was based 
on the course of action between the parties and the court's own 
concurrence in it. Plaintiffs have not only failed to show an 
abuse of discretion by the court, but have waived the issue of 
the motion's timeliness by not raising it in pleadings or oral 
argument to the trial court prior to its initial grant of summary 
judgment for defendants. 
C. The Expert Witness was Unqualified to Address Impairment 
Nor have plaintiffs established an abuse of discretion in 
the court's substantive decision finding Streumpler unqualified 
to render an opinion on Trooper Childs' alleged impairment. As 
the court explained, it 
never suggested that Dr. Richard Streumpler could not 
testify at trial about matters within his competence. 
The Court only concluded that the causal connection 
between Trooper Childs' pain therapy medications and 
Michael Kouris's death were beyond such competency and 
since there was no other designated expert and 
certainly no evidence by affidavit or otherwise from a 
competent expert before the Court, plaintiff's [sic] 
case must fail for lack of such evidence as a matter of 
law. 
R. 611. The court ruled that the motion "should be granted for 
the reasons set forth therein" (R. 610). 
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Defendants did not argue that Streumpler was unqualified to 
testify as to the levels of prescription medications found in the 
sample of Trooper Childs1 blood that was drawn immediately 
following the accident. Instead, they argued that his training 
and experience did not qualify him to testify as to whether 
Trooper Childs was medically impaired by these prescribed drugs. 
See R. 296-300. An examination of Streumpler's affidavit 
supports defendants1 argument and the court!s decision. After an 
extensive review of the substances found in the blood sample 
(R. 305-06), Streumpler's affidavit states as follows: 
10. The PDR (Physicians Desk Reference) states 
each of these medications may impair the mental and 
physical ability to drive a motor vehicle. 
11. Found alone, each of the medications in Mr. 
Childs1 blood could impair his ability to drive. 
However, taking these medications in combination (even 
at the prescribed doses) could accelerate the amount of 
impairment. 
12. In my opinion, Mr. Childs was impaired by use 
of these medications at the time of the motor vehicle 
accident on 7/19/98. 
R. 3 06 (emphasis added). The affidavit makes clear that 
Streumpler's opinion on the effect of the medications on Trooper 
Childs was based solely on speculation that possible side effects 
of the prescribed medications may have occurred. 
As prior decisions have established, where there is 
speculation as to medical causation, "!?,the claim fails as a 
matter of law."1" Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904, 
907 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 
P.2d 598, 601 (Utah App. 1995); see also Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 
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2000 UT App 285, %7, 12 P.3d 1015 (relying on Penney v. St. 
Mark's Hosp.. 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968), "for the 
proposition that 'if the expert evidence offered on the issue of 
medical causation is simply that a particular [status] could have 
resulted from a particular [event], but not that it probably did, 
such testimony is insufficient for submission of the issue to the 
jury1")). Nor is the requirement for expert medical evidence 
limited to cases of medical malpractice. See Beard, 2000 UT App 
285 at fl2. 
The cases cited by plaintiffs are readily distinguishable 
from the circumstances present here. Watkins v. Utah Poultry & 
Farmers Cooperative, 122 Utah 459, 251 P.2d 663 (1952), involved 
the testimony of non-expert, fact witnesses as to their personal 
observations of the defendant's conduct in the hours prior to an 
accident. By contrast, plaintiffs in the present case 
acknowledge that their expert has never personally examined 
Trooper Childs (see R. 545). In State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 
(Utah 1975), an officer who had held a special assignment in 
narcotics and drugs for two-and-a half years, who had attended a 
Maryland State Narcotics Seminar, and who had taken a course on 
drugs at the Utah State Police Academy was permitted to testify 
as to the probable effect of the plaintiff's use of a given 
amount of heroin seven hours before testifying. The trial court 
explained to the jury that the only charge against the 
defendant was theft; and that any evidence pertaining 
to the use of heroin had had nothing to do with her 
guilt or innocence of that charge; that they should not 
"indulge any bias or prejudice against her because of 
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the use of heroin"; and that that testimony had been 
admitted "for one purpose only, and that purpose is for 
you to try to determine her mental condition at the 
time she testifies . . . [so] you can properly evaluate 
her testimony." 
Mason, 530 P.2d at 797-98. The Court, acknowledging the trial 
court's "considerable latitude of discretion" (530 P.2d at 798), 
declined to find an abuse of discretion. In the present case, 
unlike in Mason, the expert testimony in the form of the 
Streumpler affidavit did not address a defendant's testimonial 
capacity, but directly addressed an issue pertaining to 
defendants! liability. 
The two remaining cases plaintiffs cite are not Utah cases 
and are therefore not binding authority. They are of little 
persuasive value in the light of contrary Utah precedent. In 
Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963), an 
industrial hygienist and toxicologist was permitted to testify 
that a substance is toxic to humans generally (other medically 
trained experts testified as to its effect on the plaintiff). 
However, in addition to his "extensive training and experience in 
the field of toxicology" (316 F.2d at 493), he also had "two 
years of scientific work in a medical school" (id.). Streumpler, 
by contrast, had uno medical training whatsoever" (R. 290). 
Finally, in State v. Piatt, 496 S.W.2d 878 (Mo. App. 1973), the 
challenged expert testimony was held inadmissible for lack of 
materiality. Consequently, any statement addressing the issue of 
its admissibility on other grounds is merely dictum. 
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Defendants provided substantial case authority below showing 
that non-medical experts are not qualified to testify to medical 
causation. See R. 298-300. Plaintiffs have addressed none of 
these cases, nor have they provided any authority demonstrating 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court in striking the 
Streumpler affidavit. Because the court's decision on this issue 
does not exceed the limits of reasonability, there is no basis 
for its reversal. 
D. Testimony as to Drugs in Trooper Childs1 Blood is Irrelevant 
Because It is Not Causally Linked to Any Alleged Impairment 
Plaintiffs attempt to create an issue out of Trooper Childs1 
prescription drug use by claiming that it shows Trooper Childs to 
have violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (1998). This statutory 
provision prohibits persons from operating motor vehicles if 
their bodies contain measurable quantities of controlled 
substances or their metabolites. Prescription of the controlled 
substance for the use of the accused is an affirmative defense. 
Plaintiffs1 argument on this point is simply irrelevant to 
defendants' liability, as the court correctly concluded. Not 
only does governmental immunity provide a complete defense of 
defendants' actions, making it unnecessary to reach plaintiffs' 
other claims (see Lyon, 2000 UT at UlO), but there is no evidence 
of record that suggests any causal nexus between the prescription 
medications in Trooper Childs' bloodstream at the time of the 
collision and the accident. 
Neither plaintiffs' nor defendants' accident reconstruction 
expert calculated a delay in Trooper Childs' reaction time that 
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would have contributed to the accident. When asked about 
reaction time, defendants1 expert, Newell Knight, testified in 
deposition that "I don't see any delay in his time. When I ran 
those numbers with various distances, I said I just don't see a 
delay of perception on him. I cannot at this point prove there 
was a delay of perception on the part of Cort Childs" (R. 314). 
While plaintiffs1 reconstructionist, Ronald Probert, indicated in 
his deposition that impairment would generally lengthen a 
driver's reaction time, he did not base his calculations on 
impaired reaction times (see R. 318). As the trial court 
correctly ruled, 
[W]ithout competent expert opinion of impairment at the 
time of the collision, there was no evidence of a 
causal connection between the medications allegedly 
taken by Trooper Childs and the collision, and any 
other evidence of the effect of drugs, etc., in the 
abstract[,] eg. [sic] not specifically tied to Trooper 
Childs and this incident [,] was irrelevant and 
inadmissible, both as to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and as to any trial in the matter. 
R. 610. Without a causal connection to plaintiffs' injury, any 
violation of section 41-6-44.6 is meaningless to establish 
liability. Plaintiffs' failure to establish a causal connection 
in the trial court gives this Court no ground on which to disturb 
its decision on this point. 
III. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REJECTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
After the trial court initially struck the Streumpler 
affidavit and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment 
from the bench (see R. 652 at 52), plaintiffs moved for 
reconsideration of the decision under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 
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56(f) (R. 539-78). Rule 60(b) permits a court to "relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for" various reasons, including "(2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)" and 
"(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." The basis for plaintiffs' motion was that "there were 
other designated medical witness [es] with different credentials 
who could also testify as to Trooper Childs' drug use and 
impairment" (R. 543). The witness plaintiffs identified in the 
memorandum supporting the motion was Dr. John Bender, who 
"examined Trooper Childs in November, 1991" (R. 544)--nearly 
seven years before the accident. 
As a part of their motion to reconsider, plaintiffs 
contended that the court had failed to rule on an earlier 
request, contained in their memorandum opposing the motion to 
strike the Streumpler affidavit, to grant them additional time to 
procure another affidavit pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
Attached as an exhibit to the memorandum in support of the motion 
to reconsider was Dr. Bender's affidavit (R. 563-66). Plaintiffs 
alleged that Dr. Bender was a designated witness "and that both 
parties were aware of his existence and his potential testimony, 
and therefore no surprise existed to justify this Court refusing 
to grant plaintiff's [sic] continuance" (R. 607). 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), 
[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that he 
31 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that under Rule 56(f), "courts should not 
grant such motions when a party is dilatory or the arguments are 
lacking in merit" (Aplt. Brief at 23). However, they reject the 
trial court!s conclusion 
that the delays in this matter have been predominantly 
caused by plaintiffs; plaintiff's [sic] failed to move 
to amend the designation of expert witnesses; and/or 
failed to submit with their Rule 56(f) Motion the 
affidavit of Dr. Bender; or set forth reasons for their 
failure to do so. All of the foregoing justify and 
require this Court to deny the Motion for Continuance, 
and also the Motion to Reconsider. 
R. 610. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that " [w]hen a Rule 56(f) 
motion is made, the trial court's discretion is invoked" (see 
Aplt. Brief at 23). This Court "ha[s] held that when a party 
timely presents an affidavit under rule 56(f) stating reasons why 
it is unable to proffer an evidentiary affidavit in opposition to 
its opponent's motion for summary judgment, the trial court's 
discretion is invoked." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater 
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 893 (Utah 1993). Here, no such 
affidavit wais filed. As the court noted in denying the motion 
for reconsideration, plaintiffs did not comply "with Rule 56(f) 
since they neither proffered Dr. Bender's affidavit nor set forth 
any explanation or justification why it was not provided" 
(R. 608). On appeal, plaintiffs have not addressed this finding. 
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Instead, they contend that they "proffered the testimony of Dr. 
Bender at oral argument, they offered to obtain an additional 
affidavit, and did in fact obtain that affidavit" (Aplt. Brief at 
24). None of these actions cured plaintiffs' failure to invoke 
the court's discretion by presenting an affidavit containing the 
facts relevant to their inability to provide the evidentiary 
affidavit in a timely manner. 
Contrary to plaintiffs1 argument below, plaintiffs had never 
designated Dr. Bender as a witness who could testify as to 
Trooper Childs' alleged drug impairment; in fact, they never 
identified him by name at all. Instead, they included on their 
witness list a generic designation of unnamed "medical providers 
who have treated defendant Cortland Childs in the past" (R. 108} 
to be identified more specifically as trial approached "unless 
there is a stipulation that those medical records and reports can 
be admitted without foundational testimony" (id.). No specific 
identification of these individuals was made prior to plaintiffs' 
tardy proffer. Moreover, by plaintiffs' own admission, Dr. 
Bender treated Trooper Childs in November, 1991 (R. 544). 
Plaintiffs do not articulate how a 1991 examination is relevant 
to a determination of impairment at the time of an accident that 
occurred in 1998. In addition, because Dr. Bender's affidavit as 
originally filed with the court was neither signed nor notarized 
(see R. 566), it was ineffective. See Goetz v. American Reliable 
Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 366, 372 (Utah App. 1992) (observing that 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), "affidavits 'shall set forth such 
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facts as would be admissible in evidence,' which requires an oath 
by reason of Utah R.Evid. 603"). (It is questionable whether a 
signed copy was ever filed with the court. None appears in the 
paginated record.) Finally, given plaintiffs' claim to have 
designated Dr. Bender in their April, 2000 witness list, they can 
hardly claim to have acted diligently in attempting to obtain his 
affidavit. In light of these facts, the district court cannot be 
said to have abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs1 motion 
for reconsideration, and its decision is entitled to this Court's 
affirmance. 
CONCLUSION 
The material facts that underlie this case are undisputed. 
Trooper Childs, in responding appropriately to an emergency call, 
collided with plaintiffs' minor son, with a tragic result. While 
initially suing both the trooper and his employer, plaintiffs 
relinquished all claims against Trooper Childs, choosing instead 
to pursue only a negligent supervision action against UHP. 
Because governmental immunity protects defendants from liability 
under the exception to waiver of liability for emergency vehicle 
operation, plaintiffs' claim cannot go forward. For this reason, 
the district court correctly granted summary judgment in 
defendants' favor. 
The trial court acted within its discretion to exclude the 
testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness. Not only was the issue 
of impairment beyond the witness' expertise, but it was 
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irrelevant because the Governmental Immunity Act provided a 
complete defense for defendants1 actions and because plaintiffs 
failed to establish a nexus of causation between any alleged 
impairment and the harm they suffered. It was also within the 
court's discretion to deny plaintiffs' belated attempt to 
substitute a previously unnamed witness after the judge struck 
the expert's affidavit and announced summary judgment for 
defendants from the bench. Rather than showing that the district 
court abused its discretion, plaintiffs merely repeat on appeal 
the arguments made unsuccessfully below. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, defendants 
respectfully request the Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
Dated this day of December, 2001. 
que 
Nancy l \ Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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